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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Vestal Dean Caudill appeals from his conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine. Specifically, Caudill challenges the denial of his suppression 
motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
Deputy Bernad observed Caudill driving on a dirt road before Caudill 
stopped and turned his lights off. (R., p.76.) Bernad approached Caudill's 
vehicle to ask him "how he was doing" and if he had any identification the officer 
could see. (Id.) After Caudill gave Bernad his Idaho driver's license, the officer 
ran a status check and determined Caudill had an active warrant for his arrest. 
(Id.) While conducting a search incident to Caudill's arrest, the officer located a 
methamphetamine pipe in Caudill's pant pocket. (Id.) 
The state charged Caudill with possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp.33-35.) Caudill filed a motion to suppress 
asserting the "the officer lacked probable cause" and had "no articulable nor [sic] 
objective facts upon which they [sic] could approach and detain the Defendant 
and subject him to a search in this matter." (9/27/13 Augmentation, p.1.) The 
state argued in its briefing to the court that the act of the officer approaching 
Caudill's vehicle did not constitute a stop, but was instead a consensual 




















Following a hearing on the motion to suppress, wherein the officer testified 
and a recording of the encounter was admitted into evidence, the district court 
issued an order finding "[w]hen deputy Bernad approached the Defendant, it was 
a consensual encounter." (R., p.78.) In approaching Caudill, the officer 
did not restrain the Defendant by physical force or by a show of 
authority. He did not physically confine the Defendant or block an 
exit route for the Defendant's pickup. He asked brief, permissible 
questions, and his manner was non-threatening and friendly. He 
was permitted to ask the Defendant for his identification. Deputy 
Bernad's conduct during this encounter would not have suggested 
to a reasonable person that compliance with his requests was 
required or that the Defendant was not at liberty to go about his 
business. 
(R., pp.78-79.) Because the court concluded the "limited detention" when the 
officer took Caudill's driver's license was "reasonable because it was brief and it 
occurred after Deputy Bernad's lawful contact" with Caudill, it denied Caudill's 
motion to suppress. 1 (R., p.79.) Caudill entered a conditional Alford plea to 
possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to challenge the denial 
of his motion to suppress, and the paraphernalia charge was dismissed. (R., 
pp.138-153, 171-172.) The court placed Caudill on supervised probation with an 
underlying sentence of three years with the first year fixed. (R., pp.160-163.) 
Caudill timely appealed. (R., pp.173-176.) 
1 The court also found that even if Bernad's conduct had not been lawful, the 
discover of the valid arrest warrant would have been an attenuating act 
dissipating any taint and requiring the denial of Caudill's suppression motion. 





















Caudill states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Caudill's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 






















Caudill Has Failed To Sl1ow That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Caudill's motion to suppress, finding that 
Caudill was not seized by the officer approaching and asking if he had any 
identification upon observing Caudill's vehicle parked with the lights off on a dirt 
road after the officer had just seen Caudill driving down the same dirt road and 
stop. (R., pp.75-80.) Caudill argues on appeal that despite Idaho Court of 
Appeals holdings to the contrary in State v. Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 88 P.3d 
1226 (Ct. App. 2004) and State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454 (2004) the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress as: 
he was unlawfully seized when the deputy took his driver's license, 
that the detention was unreasonable, and that the discovery of the 
outstanding warrant for his arrest did not constitute an intervening 
circumstance sufficient to dissipate the taint of the unlawful search. 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) Caudill's claims fail. A review of the record, in light of the 
applicable legal standards, supports the district court's determination that the 
officer approaching Caudill's car parked off of the dirt road was a consensual 
encounter and the officer was permitted to ask Caudill for identification. As such, 
the district court did not err when it denied Caudill's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 




















have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-
6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 
(2004). 
C. Caudill Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Motion To Suppress 
Caudill failed to present evidence at the suppression hearing establishing 
he was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. "When a defendant 
seeks to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, 
the burden of proving that a seizure occurred is on the defendant." State v. 
Fuentes, 129 Idaho 830, 832, 933 P.2d 119, 121 (Ct. App. 1997) (citations 
omitted). Caudill has failed to demonstrate that the district court's denial of the 
motion to suppress was error, as the record supports a finding that he was not 
impermissibly seized. 
Not all contacts between officers and citizens involve a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991 ); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 7 P.3d 219 
(2000); State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 978 P.2d 212 (1999); State v. Nelson, 
134 Idaho 675, 8 P.3d 670 (Ct. App. 2000); and State v. Clifford, 130 Idaho 259, 
939 P.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1997). There are three types of contacts between law 
enforcement and private citizens: (1) consensual encounters, which are not 
seizures and, therefore, require no justification; (2) stop/investigative detentions, 
which are seizures justified by reasonable suspicion; and (3) actual arrest, which 




















P.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 (Ct. 
App. 1992); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 815 P.2d 1083 (Ct. App. 1991); and 
State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 701 P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985). A consensual 
encounter is not a seizure and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment; 
therefore, an officer does not need to establish reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to justify the encounter. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), 
and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434 (1991). 
"Only when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, 
restrains the liberty of a citizen may a court conclude that a seizure has 
occurred." Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 826, 839 P.2d 1237, 1240 (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)); see also State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903, 
155 P.3d 704 (Ct. App. 2006), and State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 903 P.2d 
752 (Ct. App. 1995). The relevant inquiry in determining whether a seizure 
occurred is "whether, under all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, a 
reasonable person would have felt free to leave or otherwise decline the officer's 
requests and terminate the encounter." State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 653, 978 
P.2d 212, 213 (1999) (citation omitted). '"So long as a reasonable person would 
feel free to disregard the police and go about his business,' an encounter 
between police and an individual is consensual." State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 
613, 7 P.3d 219, 222 (2000) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 
(1991 )). 
The district court correctly determined this was a consensual encounter, 






















approaching Caudill and asking him if everything was al1·ight is analogous to a 
"knock and talk" police investigatory practice, which has clearly been recognized 
as legitimate. _§_ee U.S. v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. 
v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001)). An officer need not first develop 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before employing the strategy. 
Gould, 364 F.3d at 590, Jones, 239 F.3d at 720; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 
U.S. 429, 435 (1991). Where police do not restrict the liberty of individuals in a 
parked car, they are permitted to approach a parked vehicle and inquire as to 
what is taking place: "[t]his Court has also previously determined that police have 
the right to approach a parked vehicle and ask the occupants questions, even if 
no obvious criminal activity is afoot." State v. Randle, 152 Idaho 860, 865-866, 
276 P.3d 732, 737-738 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 827, 
839 P.2d 1237, 1241; Statev. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007, 1010, 783 P.2d 874,877 
(Ct. App. 1989).) 
Here, the officer parked his car "slightly in front of [Caudill] and off to ... 
the east of his vehicle" and did not impair Caudill's ability to move his car either 
forward or back. (Tr., p.10, Ls.5-14.) Additionally, Officer Bernad was alone 
when he approached Caudill and did not activate his overhead lights, instead 
only turning on his "rear flashers." (Tr., p.8, Ls.20-22, p.9, Ls.7-9.) There was no 
threatening presence of multiple officers and no evidence of any physical force 
by the one officer present. Caudill has failed to demonstrate that the officer 
made any show of authority or use of physical force to restrain him. Thus, he 



















I . . 
Further, Officer Bernad was permitted to ask Caudill to see his 
identification, contrary to Caudill's assertion that "his contact with the deputy 
became an illegal detention when Deputy Bernad seized his driver's license" 
(Appellant's brief, p.9): 
The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that a police 
officer's brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the 
driver's license, after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, 
is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
Landreth, 139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.2d 1226, 1230. Here, the officer was 
engaged in a permissible, consensual encounter with Caudill and was permitted 
to ask him for identification. 
Caudill has failed to demonstrate that he was "seized" in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and has necessarily failed to demonstrate error in the district 
court's denial of his motion to suppress.2 
2 Even assuming there was an impermissible detention of Caudill, the discovery 
of the warrant would have justified his arrest and the ultimate search incident to 
arrest leading to his current underlying charges. A valid arrest is an intervening 
circumstance, such that evidence discovered as a result of that arrest is 
untainted by any unlawfulness in a search and seizure that preceded the lawful 
arrest. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 845-46, 103 P.3d 454, 458-59 (2004); 
United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 1997) (outstanding arrest warrant 
gives the officer independent probable cause such that, had the officers acted 
unlawfully, the warrant would constitute an intervening circumstance dissipating 





















The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Caudill's motion to suppress. 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's:.,.,-..-,--.._..._ 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
NLS/pm 
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